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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITIES-EROSION 
OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND OF PRIVILEGE-Plain-
tiff Murray Corporation, a manufacturer of airplane parts for the federal 
government, was assessed a tax by the city of Detroit under the General 
Property Tax Act of Michigan,1 based in part on the value of materials. 
which the corporation had in its possession. Legal title to these materials 
was in the federal government.2 The corporation paid the taxes under 
protest and sued for a refund, contending that the taxes infringed the 
federal government's immunity from state taxation to the extent the taxes 
were based on the value of government property. The district court entered 
judgment for Murray and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.3 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, 
four justices dissenting. Although on its face a tax on property, in essence 
the tax is on possession of property which plaintiff used in profit-making 
l Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §211.1 et seq. See especially §211.40. 
2 Under the terms of the contract, "title to all parts, materials, inventories, work in 
progress and nondurable tools ... shall forthwith vest in the government." See Point I 
of Justice Whittaker's dissent, principal case at 514. 
3 (6th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 380. 
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activities. Since it thus has the same effect as a privilege tax which has 
uniformly been upheld, the tax is valid.4 Detroit v. Murray Corporation of 
America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958), reh. den., Justice Frankfurter dissenting, 
26 U.S. LAW WEEK 3357 (1958). 
Since McCulloch v. Maryland}'> where the conflict between a state's 
power to tax and the right of the federal government to be free from 
such taxation was first presented, the cases have distinguished between a 
tax on government property, which is invalid,6 and a tax on a person for the 
privilege of using or dealing with such property, which is valid.7 This 
basic point of departure, i.e., that a tax cannot be laid upon "the Govern-
ment, its property or officers,"8 or, re-phrased, "that possessions ... of the 
Federal Government . . . are not subject to any form of state taxation"9 
has been said to be "a bright straight line running undeviatingly through 
the decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court."10 Thus, a state can 
tax activities of private persons even though these activities may involve 
the use of government property and the value or amount of such property 
becomes the partial or exclusive measure for the tax.11 A criterion that 
had formerly been used in determining whether or not a given statute 
violated the McCulloch prohibition was whether the economic incidence 
of the tax fell on the federal government.12 Such a burden invalidated the 
tax. This concept of broad implied tax immunity has since been dis-
carded13 as unworkable when it was realized that ultimately the burden al-
ways falls on the government in some measure. The criteria which the Court 
seemed to be applying prior to the present case were (1) no tax which 
4 Jn two companion cases, United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), and United 
States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958), the Court sustained Michigan 
statutes taxing persons using exempt (government-owned) real property, even though the 
value of the use taxed was measured by the value of the exempt property. In these cases 
the statute was explicit in taxing the use of such property. The Court, speaking through 
Justice Black, saw no basic distinction between the taxes in these cases and the tax in 
the principal case. Principal case at 493. 
r; 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
6 McCulloch v. Maryland, note 5 supra; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 
174 (1944). Similarly, a federal tax on a state function has been invalidated, Collector 
v. Day, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 113 (1870). 
7 Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953); Curry v. United States, 314 
U.S. 14 (1941); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grossjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934). See also 
United States v. Detroit, note 4 supra, and United States v. Muskegon, note 4. supra. 
s James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 at 14.9 (1937). 
9 United States v. Allegheny County, note 6 supra, at 177. 
10 Opinion of Justice Frankfurter, principal case at 499. 
11 See note 7 supra. 
12 Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 434 (1842); Collector v. Day, note 6 
supra; New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936). 
13 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., note 8 supra; Helvering v. Mountain Producers 
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); 
Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). 
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was on its face a property tax was valid, and (2) even though the tax pur-
ported to be an excise tax, the Court would "look through form and behind 
labels to substance."14 Regardless of the state's determination of the nature 
of the tax, it was ultimately characterized by the Court.15 Thus, the con-
stitutionality of a tax depended upon the wording of the statute unless 
the wording was used to disguise the actual incidence of the tax. State 
taxes have been upheld, however, even though the intention of the state 
was to reach exempt property, as long as the tax was in fact one on a 
privilege.16 
The principal case promulgates a new test, which in operation may 
eliminate most limitations on intergovernmental taxation. Thus, although 
"the taxes imposed on Murray were styled a personal property tax by the 
Michigan statutes,''17 since the "operation and practical effect"18 of the 
tax was the same as if it were a tax on the privilege of using or possessing 
personal property, the statute is sustained because " ... the State could 
obviate such grounds for invalidity by merely adding a few words to its 
statutes."19 When, however, the measure of a tax is the value of the proper-
ty possessed, the "operation and practical effect" of a tax on the posses-
sion of the property is virtually identical with that of a tax on the property 
possessed.20 Thus, the basic difference between a property tax and a 
privilege tax has been its form, and if form is now to be discarded when 
the "practical effect" of the two taxes is the same, then there is no standard 
at all. The Court protests allegiance to the doctrine of McCulloch v. 
Maryland,21 yet in the principal case the entire burden of the tax is on 
the federal government, the tax is measured by the value of the federal 
property, and the tax purports to be a general property tax, although not 
directly on the government but on the person in possession of the proper-
ty.22 Whether the Court intended to modify McCulloch is doubtful, but 
14 See principal case at 492. 
15 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 at 280 (1932); Wisconsin v. 
J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 at 443-445 (1940). 
16 "Since the mere intent of the legislature to do that which the Constitution permits 
cannot deprive legislation of its constitutional validity, . . . the present act must be 
judged by its operation rather than ,by the motives which inspired it." Pacific Co. v. 
Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 at 495-496 (1932). 
17 Principal case at 492. 
1s Id. at 493. 
19 lbid. 
20 See American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 356 U.S. 21 (1958), a 5-to-4 per curiam 
decision based on the principal case, which upholds a Wisconsin tax on facts almost 
identical to the principal case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, writing before the principal 
case had been decided, sustained its tax as a property tax on the ground that while 
title was in the federal government, the "ownership" was still in the corporation. A 
dissenting opinion followed the lines of the dissent in the principal case. 274 Wis. 315 
(1957). 
21 Id. at 495. 
22 To the effect that the tax was actually assessed against the property in view of 
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that appears to be the practical effect of the decision and state and lower 
federal courts may have future difficulty in finding any tax asserted 
against private firms or individuals invalid even though the tax appears 
to be on government property. Unless the Court did intend to modify 
McCulloch, it would have been preferable to have maintained the· prior 
test based on form (a workable test, at least, despite its weaknesses) than to 
have left the area in its present nebulous state. 
Barry L. Kroll, S.Ed. 
the remedies available for nonpayment, and was not on possession of the property, see 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Whittaker, principal case at 524•5!!0, and dissent of 
Justice Frankfurter in support of grant of a rehearing, 26 U.S. I.Aw WEEK !!!!57, 3358 
(1958). 
